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Abstract
Rationale, aims and objectives The practicing doctor, and most obviously the primary
care clinician who encounters the full complexity of patients, faces several fundamental but
intrinsically related theoretical and practical challenges – strongly actualized by so-called
medically unexplained symptoms (MUS) and multi-morbidity. Systems medicine, which is
the emerging application of systems biology to medicine and a merger of molecular
biomedicine, systems theory and mathematical modelling, has recently been proposed as a
primary care-centered strategy for medicine that promises to meet these challenges. Sig-
nificantly, it has been proposed to do so in a way that at first glance may seem compatible
with humanistic medicine. More specifically, it is promoted as an integrative, holistic,
personalized and patient-centered approach. In this article, we ask whether and to what
extent systems medicine can provide a comprehensive conceptual account of and approach
to the patient and the root causes of health problems that can be reconciled with the concept
of the patient as a person, which is an essential theoretical element in humanistic medicine.
Methods We answer this question through a comparative analysis of the theories of
primary care doctor Eric Cassell and systems biologist Denis Noble.
Results and conclusions We argue that, although systems biological concepts, notably
Noble’s theory of biological relativity and downward causation, are highly relevant for
understanding human beings and health problems, they are nevertheless insufficient in fully
bridging the gap to humanistic medicine. Systems biologists are currently unable to con-
ceptualize living wholes, and seem unable to account for meaning, value and symbolic
interaction, which are central concepts in humanistic medicine, as constraints on human
health. Accordingly, systems medicine as currently envisioned cannot be said to be inte-
grative, holistic, personalized or patient-centered in a humanistic medical sense.
Introduction
‘Throughout my career, I have been searching for a medicine
to which I can belong. For me, medicine will never be a pure
and simple place and I will argue that a much more complex
but creative and useful place can be defined by the interplay
of opposites [1]’
-Iona Heath, Divided we fail: The Harveian Oration 2011.
Systems medicine [2–4] – defined as ‘the application of systems
biology to medical research and practice’ – has recently been
proposed as a future and primary care-centred strategy for health
care worldwide [5].
Throughout this exploration, we aim to contribute to an under-
standing of the strengths and limitations of this framework for
primary care. More specifically, we investigate whether it can meet
the challenge of providing clinicians with a comprehensive
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theoretical framework that can integrate the division between sci-
entific and humanistic medicine.
While scientific medicine (or ‘biomedicine’) is rooted in the
traditional world view of the natural sciences and focuses on
diseases associated with bodily parts, humanistic medicine can be
defined as ‘medical practice that focuses on the whole person and
not solely on the patient’s disease’ ([6]: p. 10). The key theoretical
element in humanistic medicine is the concept of the patient as a
person. We pursue the following research question:
Can systems medicine provide a comprehensive conceptual
account of and approach to the patient and the root causes of
health problems, and – furthermore – can such an account be
reconciled with the humanistic concept of and approach to the
patient as a person?
In this, we also seek to shed light on the key clinical challenges
of medically unexplained symptoms (MUS) and multi-morbidity.
We have chosen to approach the research question through a
comparative analysis of the relevant thinking of two key theorists.
We analyse the conceptual account of and approach to the patient
and the root causes of health problems found in the philosophy of
systems biologist Denis Noble [7] and whether it can be recon-
ciled with that found in the primary care-oriented and humanistic
medical philosophy of Eric Cassell [8,9]. A broad and compre-
hensive survey of the relevant theoretical literature on systems
biology and systems medicine has led us to state the following
premise for this investigation: Within the development of systems
medicine, Noble’s philosophy is the most humanistically inclined
[7,10], and thus representative of how close systems medicine
can come to humanistic medicine theoretically. Although Noble
may not represent mainstream systems biology, he is influential
[5,11–13]. He is much quoted in the theoretical development of
systems medicine and also involved in the conceptual foundations
of fledgling ‘systems psychiatry’ [14], which makes him directly
relevant to a field that obviously faces the challenge of reconcil-
ing scientific and humanistic conceptions of patients. Importantly,
his philosophy also represents the most comprehensive account of
the relevant questions we have found within the current systems
biological literature. Cassell’s philosophy is chosen as a repre-
sentation of humanistic medicine more broadly and as the most
comprehensive and authoritative philosophy of patients as
persons currently found in humanistic medicine. As such,
Cassell’s philosophy reflects what Noble and systems medicine
must account for in order to bridge the sciences–humanities
divide.
Background
The challenges of primary care
The practising clinician, and most obviously the primary care
doctor who is confronted with the full and uncategorized complex-
ity of human function and dysfunction on a daily basis, experi-
ences several related challenges. These also represent the ultimate
real-life trials that systems medicine – no less than humanistic
medicine – has to stand up to in order to prove relevant as a
strategy for primary care.
One fundamental need and challenge lies at the heart of medical
practice: the necessity of providing a comprehensive conceptual
account of and approach to the patient as an entity and of the root
causes of health problems.
A second challenge is that, in providing such a conceptual
account and approach, medicine takes on a dual philosophical
appearance. The clinician is expected to approach the patient in a
way that is not only scientifically valid and evidence based, but
also sensitive to the full range of human capacities, including
individual experience, needs and values. These two aspects are
typically expected to coexist or merge in the concept of
knowledge-based practice, but exactly how such a merger should
come about is far from obvious. On the contrary, the doctor is
pulled in two different theoretical and practical directions –
towards scientific and towards humanistic medicine [6]. This
reflects a more general division of Western intellectual life,
described by CP Snow in 1959 as ‘The two cultures’ [15]. In what
follows, we will describe the sides of this division (asterisks ‘*’
refer the reader to the definitions in Box 1):
At the heart of scientific medicine, the branch of medicine that
currently dominates the profession’s view of what counts as a
medical explanation lies the machine metaphor, which depicts all
living entities as machines. In this, scientific medicine is materi-
alist*, reductionist and mechanistic [6,16,17]. The patient is seen
as ‘nothing but’ parts in interaction and should, as a corollary, be
understood, studied and treated by focusing on those parts
[6,18,19]. Associated with this conceptualization is molecular
determinism or ‘smallism’ [20], the belief that entities at the
molecular scale or level* are causally privileged. Accordingly,
patients and their functions and dysfunctions (diseases) are
depicted as being caused by interacting parts through ‘upward’
causation [21]. The lower scales or levels*, especially the
genome, hold the necessary information to ‘inform’ the larger
scales or higher levels as through a programme [17]. As a cor-
ollary, the emergent phenomena that arise from such interactions
of parts are given an inferior ontological* status. They are said to
be epiphenomenal – that is causally insignificant and not as con-
crete as parts. The patient is considered as a passive and static
thing rather than an active and dynamic process [22]. As math-
ematical biologist Stuart Kauffman [23] has pointed out, there
are no ‘doings’ in this world view and, accordingly, patients
have no real agency. Additionally, a dismissal of teleology and
final causes* as non-scientific further downplays any goal-
directedness, purpose or will in human action [17,24–26].
Smallism also downplays the patient’s environmental, especially
social and symbolic relations (including the doctor–patient rela-
tionship). Even the personal experiences conveyed by patients,
notably in the form of narratives, are being denigrated as private
or too complex and uncountable for ‘objective’ scientific study
[6,27]. In sum, scientific medicine attempts to reduce the per-
sonal or ‘psychosocial’ to molecular and cellular mechanisms or
programs in the brain. However, as this does not make subjective
personal experience go away, ontological mind–body dualism*
prevails in practice [28].
As indicated by biological anthropologist Terrence Deacon [25],
scientific denial of human agency, goal-directedness, purpose,
consciousness, meaning and value renders biological understand-
ing of patients an unfinished business and encourages the
sciences–humanities divide. Relatedly, this depiction of patients
encourages technological intervention directed at body parts rather
than personal and social factors [29].
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Humanistic medicine represents a reaction to this perceived
dehumanizing and medicalizing trend. We follow Marcum [6] in
broadly categorizing a variety of frameworks and lines of thought
as humanistic, including biopsychosocial, patient- or relationship-
centred, narrative-based, person-focused and person-centred medi-
cine as well as medical phenomenology [30–37]. Humanistic
medicine strives to maintain sensitivity to the full range of human
capacities, experiences and needs in medicine, and to integrate
what is called ‘psychosocial’ with biomedicine in the concept of
the patient as a person [35]. It is currently far from clear, however,
just how such an integration can be achieved.
Medically unexplained symptoms
and multi-morbidity
The prevailing panorama of health problems represents a third
major challenge of primary care. Scientific medicine has led to
obvious benefits, but a variety of common, complex and costly
conditions strongly actualize the challenge of theoretical develop-
ment. Two key examples are so-called functional disorders or
MUS and multi-morbidity. Importantly, systems biological
methods are currently starting to be applied to these problems
[5,38].
The MUS category encompasses hundreds of diagnostic labels,
for example, the chronic fatigue syndrome [39], which represent
some of the most common problems in Western medicine [40,41].
The root causes of MUS are poorly understood. However, it is
important to note that, when these problems are categorized as
medically unexplained, they are unexplained in a certain way,
namely according to the current ontology and epistemology of
scientific medicine. And as they are in fact defined by their very
scientific unexplainedness, they seem likely to highlight the short-
comings in parts-oriented conceptualizations and explanations of
patients and health problems, especially concerning the relations
between ‘bio’, ‘psycho’ and ‘socio’ in biopsychosocial thinking
[33,39–41].
Multi-morbidity refers to the phenomenon that patients, accord-
ing to current scientific standards, often satisfy the criteria for
many diagnoses. These patients are therefore, by biomedical con-
vention, thought to have many separate diseases, each presumably
caused by specific pathogenetic mechanisms related to specific
body parts or subsystems, and each correspondingly treated in
parts-focused and separate ‘silos’ of medicine [42]. There is
however, emerging evidence, which indicates that many common
chronic conditions, which typically cluster and often include
MUS, might be produced by pathogenetic life circumstances,
sometimes referred to as ‘the causes of the causes’ [42–44].
The above challenges all trigger fundamental questions relating
to philosophy of science, causality, biology and mind that involve
known dichotomies such as reductionism (parts) vs. holism
(wholes), psyche vs. soma, subjectivity vs. objectivity, illness vs.
disease and mechanistic explanation vs. meaning [45]. As a con-
sequence, the doctor who professionally seeks to straddle the
scientific–humanistic divide, struggles to find a valid reference
point [1].
Systems medicine to the challenge
Enter systems medicine. At a first glance, this proposed para-
digm intriguingly seems to offer the clinician promises and hope
that his/her challenges may soon be catered for by scientific pro-
gress. Systems medicine is at once proposed as aiming to tackle
all components of disease complexity* and as being holistic, inte-
grative, personalized and compatible with patient-centred medi-
cine [5]. Systems medicine has also been said to favor a ‘novel
humanism directed to the management of the patient as individ-
ual subject’ [46]. However, the given impression that systems
medicine can integrate theoretical elements from ‘scientific’
and ‘humanistic’ medicine is not obviously valid and deserves
scrutiny.
Broadly conceived, systems biology is a convergence of
molecular biology and systems theory [47–53]. Molecular biology
Box 1 Definitions
Epistemology is the study of knowledge, of what can be known and how we know it [49].
Ontology is the part of metaphysics concerned with what exists in the universe and how it is structured [19]. Materialism/physicalism is ‘The
thesis according to which all higher level properties are realized by arrangements of lower level properties. On this view, there are no
metaphysically irreducible properties of conscious or other mental states’ [63]. Ontological dualism is the idea that the universe (including
persons) is made of two distinct substances, that is, ‘mind’ and ‘matter’ [27].
Complexity: There is no consensus on how to define this key concept, but it can be characterized as a property of systems in which entities at
a lower level/smaller scale interact non-linearly and dynamically (through time). These interactions result in emergent (novel) properties in the
system (whole) that cannot be found in the parts in isolation. The system is then said to display higher degrees of complexity or organization.
The emergent whole may or may not be taken to have causal efficacy in itself [19].
Levels and scales: According to Noble, scale is the size of a system. Systems of different scale may be nested within each other. Examples of
levels are molecules, cells, organs and organisms. This hierarchy of levels is metaphorical as these entities are not literally on top or below each
other. Levels and scales will in the context of patients be correlated [69]. Molecules are (in reality) nested within cells, within organs, within
organisms, within an environment at successively larger scales [64]. These scales and levels also correspond to successively higher levels of
complexity or organization [70]. A (multicellular) organism/patient is more complex and highly organized than cells or molecules. Noble
conceptually prefers the term scale, but nonetheless uses ‘levels’ metaphorically in causal explanations.
Intentionality: In a phenomenological sense ‘consciousness is intentional, in the sense that it “aims towards” or “intends” something beyond
itself’. Intentionality may also refer to the purpose or goal-directedness of acts, which is ‘only one kind of intentionality in the phenomenological
sense’ [81].
Types of causes: Aristotle established four causes: ‘Material (substances), efficient (mechanisms), formal (circumstances) and final (needs)’.
Material and efficient causes answer questions like ‘what is this and how does it work?’ while formal and final causes answer questions like ‘why
did this happen?’ [24].
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has culminated in ‘omics’, that is the sequencing of whole bodily
‘parts lists’, including DNA (genomics), RNA (transcriptomics)
and protein (proteomics). The resulting massive amounts of infor-
mation on parts have not in themselves yielded the sought-after
understanding of wholes, predictive power or medical break-
throughs [54]. Rather, it would seem that biology has ‘hit the wall
of bio-complexity, reductionism’s nemesis’ [18]. Fundamentally,
the connection between parts, especially the genome (genotype),
and the whole organism (the phenotype) stands unaccounted for
[19,55,56]. The manifest goal of systems biology is precisely to
make this connection. Its method is to integrate data on parts, in
the context of medicine ‘billions of data points’ [5] into explana-
tory and predictive mathematical (computational) models of
patients as wholes (aka ‘systems’). Its ambition is no less than to
calculate life [52].
Importantly, systems biology is not a homogeneous scientific
discipline. Although it is clear that systems biology is currently
dominated by a highly parts-oriented approach that conceptualizes
and investigates patients as networks of molecules [47,48,
51,53,57,58], a minority, exemplified by Noble, seeks a more
fundamental philosophical reorientation. Noble also explicitly
espouses a humanizing ambition, stating that the focus on lower-
level causes in biomedicine may lead to a dehumanizing approach
that ‘encourages treatment of the disease while ignoring the par-
ticular patient who has the disease’ [10].
Cassell’s humanistic medicine: patients
as persons
Such dehumanization is precisely what Eric Cassell and other
thinkers who espouse humanistic medicine seek to remedy. Their
ambition is to ground medical practice in a comprehensive theory
of the patient as a person.
Mind and body
As a point of departure in developing such a theory, Cassell
describes how the trauma of 9/11 manifested as health problems in
affected New Yorkers [8]. He then asks how and why* such a
perturbation – which would often be described as ‘emotional’ or
‘psychosocial’ – could have profound impacts described as ‘physi-
cal’? In approaching such a conundrum (the mind–body problem),
Cassell stresses that our current conceptions of ‘mind’ and ‘body’
are inadequate. Asking how the mind affects the body, and vice
versa are the wrong questions because any fundamental mind–
body or person–body duality is false and entities that are not
separate cannot affect each other in a conventional, mechanistic
sense.
Instead, Cassell holds not only that the body and the physical
participates in everything a person does, but that what we call
physical or biological should be viewed as mental, purposeful and
social [8]. Persons are embodied, they have a body, but if the body
were properly understood, it would also incorporate all the capac-
ities attributed to ‘the mind’.
Agency
In further explaining the unity of mind and body, Cassell depicts
the person more as an unfolding process with a history and a
future, ‘existing through time in a narrative sense’ ([9]: p. 28),
rather than as a static object. The concept of agency, the ability to
act becomes crucial. Cassell emphasizes an activating language
when conceptualizing persons: ‘Persons do things; they act, think,
have emotions, create music, express love, get sick, urinate, see
and feel things, and more’ ([8]: p. 235). What is called ‘mind’ and
what is called ‘body’ is blurred and sought unified under the
common heading of activities: ‘The word mind is useful as a label
for a whole bunch of activities that are characteristic of persons
such as thinking, reasoning, assigning meaning, dreaming, imag-
ining, creating, emotions, and others. You will find, that (. . .) you
can easily do without the noun mind. One merely needs to substi-
tute the word for the activity – thoughts, imagining, reasoning,
willing, and so on’ ([8]: p. 242).
Consciousness, meaning and value
According to Cassell, even conscious experience and perception
are bodily activities, and meaning, the active labelling of experi-
ence so that it has aboutness and significance, is his core concept.
Meanings also have important value-aspects and are always
subjective [9].
Meaning is to Cassell what unifies what is usually termed mind
and body [8]. Meanings do not affect the body as a separate thing,
meanings involve the body and ‘include physical manifestations as
an essential and irreducible part of the meaning of things’ ([8]:
p. 263). Importantly, the activities of the person on every level are
based on meanings. The person becomes a meaning-creating,
meaning-based process or activity.
Purpose, goal-directedness and will
This also means that the activities of the person are purposeful and
goal-directed according to some meaning. In other words, they are
intentional* and have a teleological aspect. Some actions are auto-
matic, instinctual or habitual, but some are also volitional or willed
[59].
Particularity, relationality and narrative
To Cassell, the person is a particular case, an individual different
from any other person [8]. At the same time, persons are strongly
related to their environments, especially to social processes and
activities [8].
Crucially, from an epistemological and methodological stand-
point, Cassell’s philosophy – like humanistic medicine in general
– is characterized by the belief that persons and their complexity
can be known not only by studying constituents, but from the
information and meaning conveyed and generated through human
symbolic interaction, notably narratives, and that the doctor–
patient relationship is an arena for such knowing [8,9].
Parts and wholes
In explaining the unity of the person, mind and body, Cassell also
makes important statements about parts and wholes. Concerning
persons, ‘anything that happens to one part affects the whole; what
affects the whole affects every part. All the parts are interdepend-
ent and not one functions completely separate from the rest’ ([8]:
H. Vogt et al. Systems medicine and the patient
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p. 221). The brain is part of the body, important, but in no way
identical to, or exclusive, when it comes to defining the mind or
person [8].
However, what Cassell seems to lack is a valid causal theory of
how the whole person (characterized by the properties often des-
ignated as ‘mind’ or ‘psychosocial’) can affect the parts like
genomes, transcriptomes and proteomes (which in reductionist
terms represent ‘the body’). This shortcoming also reflects a
broader theoretical vacuum in humanistic and biopsychosocial
medicine [32,41,60].
Noble’s systems biology: persons as
integrative processes
In his book ‘The Music of Life’ [7], systems biologist Denis Noble
describes an instant where something makes him cry. He then asks
a question, which like Cassell’s question regarding the conse-
quences of 9/11, invites an answer of ‘how’ and ‘why’. He asks:
‘So, what caused me to cry’? This question also fully reflects the
complexity of a primary care patient walking into the clinic. It
could be anything.
Parts and wholes
Any systems biologist would agree that such a question could only
be answered by considering the patient as a whole, that is as a
complex system or network [53]. A paraphrased1 Nature editorial
reads
“What is the difference between a live patient and a dead
one? One scientific answer is ‘systems biology’. A dead
patient is a collection of component parts. A live patient is the
emergent behavior of the system incorporating those parts
[61].”
Systems biologists will also acknowledge biological complexity,
emphasize the inter-relations of entities at all levels and thus also
view the patient as open to the environment. Quote Hofmeyr [62]:
‘Nothing in an organism makes sense except in the light of context
(. . .) Context captures the essence of the systems approach’.
But any agreement among systems biologists in conceptualizing
the patient would stop there. For just how systems or wholes and
their emergent properties are to be defined ontologically, is a main
point of contention [47,48,52]. We may draw a main dividing line
between those who emphasize that wholes have some form of
causal efficacy over their parts (downward or top-down causation),
and those who do not. According to Noble, downward causation is
not only what gives living systems their integrity and robustness to
stressors and ‘distinguishes a functioning organism from a bunch
of molecules’ [48], it should also be regarded as the main principle
of systems biology and a possible ‘integrating theme within and
across the sciences’ [63].
Noble’s philosophy is ‘anti-smallist’. His theory of biological
relativity challenges the reductionist assumption that what is small
is causally most important. It is defined by ‘the relativistic princi-
ple that there is no privileged scale of causality in biology’ [64].
This means that what happens at the molecular scale, including the
genome, should not be regarded as causally more important than
events at the scale of the whole organism, which can also cause
events at smaller scales [64,65].
How can this be? Firstly, Noble argues that there is no a priori
reason to consider molecular scale processes as more important
than organism-scale processes. If small were privileged, we should
look at even smaller scales than the molecular [64]. Secondly, he
supports his theory mathematically: the parts of a system may be
represented by a series of differential equations. If only the parts
mattered, one would think that the properties of the whole would
emerge from these equations. But to model a whole, one needs to
reflect the whole and integrate the differential equations [66].
Thirdly, Noble refers to physicist Laurent Nottale’s theory of scale
relativity. This is beyond the scope of this article, but entails a
more general principle of relativity of all scales in nature (for
details, see [64,65,67,68]). Fourthly, Noble supports his theory
with empirical evidence, primarily his own work on the pacemaker
rhythm of the heart. Here, the electrical cell potential of the whole
heart cell, the rhythm itself, causes the behaviour of the parts
‘top-down’ [7,22,63,69–71].
How can downward causation be further described? Noble
defines it as ‘the influence of boundary conditions determined by
a higher scale’ [64]. Boundary conditions are in turn defined as ‘all
the structural and environmental conditions that constrain the
behaviour of the components’ [64]. These constraints can also be
seen as feedback loops. To Noble, the transmission of information
goes both ways: from parts to wholes, but also from wholes to
parts [11].
Mind and body
According to Noble, the capacities associated with ‘the mind’ are
grounded in matter. However, within these boundaries of materi-
alism* and in line with his theory of biological relativity, Noble
does not depict the self, the person or ‘mind’, as mere epiphenom-
ena [72]. Instead, he asks ‘For humans at least, to live is to
experience. How can we understand this?’ ([7]: p. 1).
Agency
Time is central in Noble’s conceptualization of entities at all scales
and levels*, including patients: ‘The really significant philosophi-
cal difference between systems biology and reductionist biology is
that systems biology focuses on processes rather than components’
[10]. Whole organisms like patients with their capacities are as
important causal agents as lower level processes. The actions of a
person in an environment, may just as well serve as a causal
explanation as a molecular mechanism. The genome is not ‘The
book of life’ or a programme for the organism. On their own, DNA
molecules can do very little. According to Noble, they should more
properly be regarded as passive stores of crucial information, a
tool that the active, living organism uses [7]. Noble’s central
argument is that ‘the book of life is life itself’([7]: p. 10).
Consciousness, meaning and value
In a similar way, the brain does very little on its own in Noble’s
view. It is necessary, but not sufficient in explaining consciousness
and the other attributes we call ‘the mind’ [72]. The brain, and its
1 We have substituted the word ‘cat’ in the original text with ‘patient’ to
more properly reflect what one is dealing with in medicine.
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molecular and cellular mechanisms, is not something that is syn-
onymous with or dictates the self or the person. Even if scientists
had been able to reduce the capacities we attribute to ‘the mind’ to
molecules, cells or brains, this is not the level where such phe-
nomena can be seen to exist or be causally explained. Instead,
Noble conceptualizes the mind or self, including consciousness, as
an integrative, higher level process rather than a thing [72,73].
When Noble uses the word ‘meaning’, it is in the sense of such
higher level processes or wholes giving meaning to DNA by con-
straining its function: ‘The organism itself contains the key to
interpreting its DNA, and so to give it meaning’ [74].
Purpose, goal-directedness and will
This means that Noble does not use the word meaning in the way
Cassell does. However, he does consider intentional action and
will to be real [7,71,72]. He accepts teleological explanations at
the organismal level, although he underscores that lower level
mechanistic explanations may also be sought for the same phe-
nomena [7,71,75]. Although Noble himself does not elaborate on
this, biological theorist Stanley Salthe states that ‘constraints from
the higher level not only help to select the lower level-trajectory
but also pull it into its future at the same time’ [76]. Noble also
mentions one other key concept for systems biology that may play
a role in conceptualizing purposes and goals. The constraint of the
whole system entails a statistical tendency for it to be drawn
towards a certain future behaviour called an attractor [64,72,74].
Relationality, particularity and narrative
In sum, what is a person to Noble? It is the activity of a human
organism: ‘The activity of the brain and of the rest of the body
simply is the activity of the person, the self’ [69]. Crucially, this
self or the person is not a simple or passive thing, but a conscious,
integrative process with the causal power to constrain processes at
lower levels and scales [7,14,73]. In explaining the overall func-
tioning of persons, their activities must be considered in a social
and semantic context [7,72,73]. Noble underscores that ‘(. . .)
when we start to talk about the location of the self, we are talking
about a person. Such talk belongs to a context in which it makes
sense to refer to persons’ ([7]: p. 134). Finally, while searching for
general principles that govern human biology, Noble quotes
Sulston & Ferry on the particularity of the patient: ‘The complex-
ity of control, overlaid by the unique experience of each individ-
ual, means that we must continue to treat every human as unique
and special, and not imagine that we can predict the course of a
human life other than in broad terms’ [74].
Analysis and discussion
Could systems medicine, ad modum Noble, provide a comprehen-
sive conceptual account of and approach to patients and the root
causes of health problems that would enable the building of a
bridge towards humanistic medicine ad modum Cassell? Would
such an account be relevant to primary health care in general and
clinical challenges like MUS and multi-morbiditity?
Similarities and integration
Conceptually, the similarities between Noble and Cassell are
obvious and striking. We would expect Cassell to see the patient as
deduced from Noble’s philosophy as a more properly understood
body or organism than the current depiction found in scientific
medicine.
In what we perceive as a mirror image of Cassell’s philosophy,
time enters the picture in Noble’s theorizing and they both seem to
lean towards process ontology as opposed to a particle- or thing-
oriented ontology and the notion that an integrative theory of
human function and dysfunction should have an historical perspec-
tive [22,77]. To both, music serves as a metaphor for this process
nature of living persons [7,8]. Crucially, Noble, just as Cassell,
advocates an activating conceptual language based on verbs that
convey ‘the doing-ness’ of living processes rather than nouns [7].
To both, this doing-ness serves to conceptually unify what we call
‘mind’ and ‘body’. As Noble states: ‘The significance of this way
of expressing things is then best brought out by noting that
Descartes’ famous philosophical statement ‘I think, therefore I am’
(cogito ergo sum) could be more minimally expressed as ‘thinking,
therefore being.’ ‘Thinking’ requires that a process exists, just as
‘going’ does, but it does not require that we should reify that
process’ [72].
Importantly, Noble seems able to provide a promising theoreti-
cal ‘bridgehead’ towards what Cassell and humanistic medicine
are missing: a valid causal theory of how ‘bio’, ‘psycho’ and
‘socio’ actually relate. In Noble’s philosophy, the patient at an
organismal scale – the self or the person – acts on smaller scale
processes by constraining, limiting or focusing their interactions
and so to determine their functions [64,65,70]. The dynamic
organization of the whole organizes – or orchestrates – the smaller
scale processes. As Noble indicates, downward causation can be
depicted as focusing the lower level processes and thus enabling or
bringing forth the emergent properties that arise from them and
thus serve as a metaphor for agency and intentional action
[17,26,70,73]. If information is defined ‘as any kind of event that
affects the state of a dynamic system’ [56], patients continually
create novel information through emergence. This information
becomes part of the boundary conditions or dynamic organization
of the whole and in turn acts as a feedback that makes a difference
to functions at smaller scales [12,70]. This makes it possible to
consider patients as being their own organizing principles,
boundary conditions, feedbacks, constraints and attractors. Noble,
like Cassell, also accepts the concept of intentionality and tele-
ological explanations at the level of whole patients. For what kind
of cause* is downward causation in terms of constraints? It is not
a material or mechanistic (efficient) cause as in parts ‘bumping’
into each other, which is the standard way of looking at causation
in biological science, but more like a formal and perhaps final
cause [17,24,25]. As suggested by biologist Jim Shapiro, words
like ‘downward control’ or ‘downward regulation’ may be more
appropriate than ‘causation’, which connotes mechanisms [11].
Crucially, Noble is also in line with Cassell, when he states that
the functioning of the self or person must be understood in a social
context.
Relevance to clinical challenges
How may this be relevant to clinical problems like MUS and
multi-morbidity? Epistemologically and methodologically, the
theory of biological relativity implies that, when primary care
doctors seek causal explanations for their patients’ health problem,
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they should not automatically regard smaller scale processes as the
most valid focus of investigation. The scale of the living person,
constrained by an environment, might be just as valid in under-
standing how a given trait is integrated or disintegrated. It may
well be that medically unexplained symptoms, for example, those
constituting the chronic fatigue syndrome [39], simply do not
exist, or cannot be explained, at the level of molecules or cells, and
that they reflect clinical scenarios where downward causation is
especially important to consider. Biological relativity implies that
the relevant physiology may be integrated at the scale of the
patient in an environment. As a corollary, it may well be that the
disintegration experienced and observed in such syndromes must
be grasped by considering processes at these scales. At what level
such integration or disintegration is to be pinned down is, accord-
ing to Noble, an empirical question [64]. Meanwhile, we hypoth-
esize that medically unexplained syndromes may be ‘functional’ in
a very simple sense: their causal explanation may be found at the
level of the context-dependent functioning of patients as persons,
and their automatic, instinctual, habitual or volitional activities,
including perception itself. It may well be that the very
unexplainedness of these syndromes is related to the way tradi-
tional scientific medicine tends to leave larger scales out of the
causal picture. They may be ‘person-level disorders’ left unex-
plained because persons themselves and their interpersonal rela-
tions are not considered to be root causes. Similarly, the effects of
the doctor–patient relationship, so-called placebo and nocebo
effects [78], as well as context-dependent personal experiences
like loneliness [79] and other social conditions may also broadly
be seen as integrating or disintegrating constraints. Note that, as
Noble has pointed out [65], the traditional use of words like ‘root’
and ‘underlying’ to describe the most important causes falsely
imply that they should necessarily be found at the bottom of some
hierarchy of scales or levels. Metaphorically, constraints (down-
ward causation) may perhaps suitably be described as
‘overarching’ causes in order to communicate their importance as
‘the causes of the causes’.
The theory of biological relativity should also lead to a recon-
sideration of the concept of multi-morbidity and medical tax-
onomy. The ontological implications of the concept of downward
causation would imply that what is considered separate diseases
with separate causes may fruitfully be regarded as different mani-
festations of ‘overarching’ constraints. What is considered multi-
morbidities (e.g. different MUS in one person) may causally
cluster at the level of patients as persons or their environment. The
theory may also lead to a reconsideration of current efforts in
disease categorization and the default premise that health prob-
lems are best categorized at the level of parts. One example is
mainstream systems medicine itself, which seems to focus mainly
on how diseases ‘cluster at the genetic, molecular or mechanistic
level’ [5]. Another example is the genome- and brain-focused
Research Domain Criteria developed by the National institutes of
Mental Health for psychiatry [80].
Differences and remaining gaps
Although Noble’s philosophy may contribute significantly to a
bridging between scientific and humanistic medicine, there are
certain differences with Cassell’s and limitations that need to be
considered. The most striking difference between the two is the
relative absence of the concepts of meaning and value in Noble’s
writings. Noble also has trouble in fully accounting for conscious-
ness and intentionality. But so has Cassell and science in general
[81]. We believe this illustrates a more fundamental shortcoming,
what Deacon calls the unfinished business of science [25]. In
accordance with this, Noble underscores that there is no genuine
theory of biology, and that systems biology must learn from other
fields in developing its ‘musicality’ of life [10,69]. This points to a
fundamental problem for scientists in general and systems
biologists in particular: they do not fully know how to ontolo-
gically conceptualize their subject matter: living wholes
[23,47,49,69,76,81]. The concepts that influence systems biologi-
cal thought are currently taken mostly from the engineering sci-
ences and physics, and systems biologists often emphasise the
commonalities rather than the differences between man and
machine [82,83]. If persons are to be considered their own self-
organizers and constraints, it is important to note that these con-
cepts do not as yet explain the difference between living agents
and non-living entities [84]. For example, it is difficult to know
what kind of agency or will is granted to humans when looking at
them as their own self-constraints. Concerning the concept of
attractors as a metaphor for goal-directedness, one must also note
that attractors are rule-governed in a way that human beings may
not be [85].
So, why did Denis Noble cry? In his book, he explains that the
cause was related to his listening to a musical work: ‘We would say
that the causes of me crying include: Schubert, because he wrote
the music; the piano trio, because they played it with such heart-
tugging inspiration; and the beautiful context in which I first heard
the music and first cried as a result of it. This, we would say, is in
my memory and forms the emotional context’ ([7]: p. 2). One
could add that the crying could also be seen as an act, as caused by
someone actively engaging with the music, and as meaningful
symbolic communication unique to humans [86]. Human beings
are not like conventional pieces of music. As Noble points out,
living humans ‘play themselves’ [7]. And it is exactly here systems
medicine faces its deepest challenge. Systems medicine risks
reducing patients to systems, while current concepts of systems
may be inadequate in comprehensively mapping human function-
ing [47,85]. Given such caveats, it is interesting to note that con-
ceptual work is ongoing to further such understanding – with
great potential for understanding of patients [17,20,22–
26,41,56,57,63,76,77,81,87–92].
In addition to conceptual limitations, it is also important to note
that Noble and Cassell differ methodologically. For while systems
medicine is all about calculating human life in mathematical
models, Cassell underscores the patient’s narrative and the
doctor–patient communication itself as key sources of information
about living human systems. To Cassell, dismissing personal
experience and meaning as unscientific is the cardinal mistake of
medicine, it is like ‘deploring the fact that patients are human’
([9]: p. xxiv). The humanistic medical interest in narratives stems
from the need to grasp the complexity of human biology compre-
hensively [36]. However, although Noble may well agree, the
concept of narrative plays little or no explicit role in his account.
This leads to the question: Can systems medicine, defined as a
purely quantitative science, tackle the fullness of human
biocomplexity, which inevitably also defines the full complexity
of human health and disease?
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As we have noted, most of systems medicine has a strongly
molecularized concept of and approach to patients. It is no coin-
cidence that the website of the influential Institute of Systems
Biology is called ‘Molecular Me’ [58]. However, systems medi-
cine has also been characterized – and must be taken seriously – as
the medical science that aims to study the way wholes constrain
their components [93]. From an epistemological and methodologi-
cal standpoint, this must mean that, in order to get a comprehen-
sive understanding of human health, one must ultimately also
consider specifically human constraints. In this regard, it is vital to
remember that the evolutionarily derived and key defining features
of human biology are in fact our cultural capacities of symbolic
interaction and creation of narratives [94,95]. The theory of bio-
logical relativity implies that these human activities should, a
priori, be considered as important when considering human health
as lower-level functions.
This poses a fundamental challenge to systems medical proj-
ects: if systems medicine aims to bridge the genotype–phenotype
gap, it needs mathematically usable representations not only
of parts (genomes, transcriptomes, proteomes, etc.), but also of
wholes, so-called phenomes. A phenome is a ‘characterization of
the full set of phenotypes of an individual’ [96]. Intriguingly,
human ‘phenomics’ and a Human Phenome Programme have been
called for [55]. Taking the integrative perspective of general prac-
tice, we support the development of an organismic, wholes-
oriented systems medicine [57]. However, no matter how detailed
human phenomes may become, it is still difficult to see how
systems biologists can mathematically represent human agency,
intentionality and values which are linked to the defining human
features of symbolic interaction and narrative. Considering that it
is unclear how systems biologists are to quantify a human brain or
a living human organism with symbolic behaviour and other social
relations, an account of all components of disease complexity, as
promised by Bousquet et al. [5], seems outside the scope of quan-
titative systems medicine. For example, if human agency, includ-
ing symbolic activities, are causally influential constraints in
medically unexplained syndromes, it is difficult to see how
systems medicine can faithfully model these very common and
costly health problems mathematically as is currently being
proposed [38].
This is also important in considering systems medicine as ‘per-
sonalized’. Systems biologists Wolkenhauer, Mesarovic and
Wellstead state that ‘personalized medicine (. . .) requires us to
know the parameters that define the individuality of the particular
patient’ [97]. However, given that the constraints of human sym-
bolic interaction and personal narrative are important in defining
human particulars, and that these biological features cannot be
meaningfully parameterized or otherwise mathematically
described, systems medicine as a fully personalizing science also
seems beyond reach even in theory. In practice, systems medicine
also has the need to develop ‘parameters that define the average,
idealized, healthy individual’ [3].
Significantly, founding father of systems biology, Ludwig von
Bertalanffy [98], who originally also inspired George Engel’s
biopsychosocial model [30], was aware of such caveats. He
regarded symbolism as a defining feature of humankind, noted that
there are aspects of human biology one cannot expect to formulate
mathematically and advocated complementary models formulated
in ordinary language. In a way that seems fundamentally relevant
today as systems biology is finally set to define medicine,
Bertalanffy also cautioned against the dehumanizing potentials of
a science that disregards such humanistic concerns:
‘(. . .) to the new utopians of systems engineering (. . .) it is
the “human element” which is precisely the unreliable com-
ponent of their creations. It either has to be eliminated alto-
gether and replaced by the hardware of computers, self-
regulating machinery and the like, or it has to be made as
reliable as possible, that is mechanized, conformist, controlled
and standardized’ ([98]: p. 10).
Conclusion
We conclude that systems medicine ad modum Noble can contrib-
ute significantly in reinstating the person in human biology and
medicine. But while Noble’s theoretical effort within the field of
systems biology is a significant step towards bridging the
sciences–humanities gap, systems medicine seems likely to
remain incomplete as a foundation for clinical understanding and
practice. Considering also that most of today’s systems medicine
seems more molecularly focused than Noble, the image of systems
medicine as ‘holistic’, ‘personalized’, ‘patient-centred’ or ‘human-
istic’ in the sense being directed towards the ‘patient as individual
subject’ lacks an adequate theoretical foundation at this time. As
Noble also makes crystal clear: ‘On the one hand, it seems sensible
to deal only with what we can observe, measure and understand.
This is the pragmatic approach of science. (. . .) On the other hand,
it is laughably presumptous to suppose that this resolves all ques-
tions about life. Clearly, it can’t’ ([75]: p. 120).
Systems medicine must therefore be complemented with other
methods. Again, Noble seems to recognize this: ‘The point is that
in practice we know when we act intentionally. We don’t need to
study our brain states to know that’ ([7]: p. 125). Narrative-based
medicine and phenomenology are examples of candidates for such
complementary fields of knowing, and efforts are ongoing in
linking human biology to phenomenology [17,36,37,39,40,81].
Hunter and co-workers have stated that systems biological
models should be integrated with ‘wisdom produced in the
research laboratories and in clinical practice’ [4]. We suggest that
the wisdom of experienced general practitioners [1] and core chal-
lenges like multi-morbidity and medically unexplained symptoms
should serve as reference points of primary care complexity in the
development of systems medicine. The similarities and differences
between Cassell and Noble may also serve as one fruitful point of
departure for further work in developing a future unifying theory
of medicine. Ultimately, systems medicine may also have to rec-
ognize that, to faithfully model a human being, it is necessary to be
a human being.
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